Southeast Asia’s Response to the US-China Rivalry

This article is part of the series—Jakarta Edit 2025

For a long time, Southeast Asia’s approach to regionalism and great-power competition between the United States and China could be summed up by a simple phrase – “We do not want to choose sides”. Through this posture, Southeast Asian states carved out autonomy and agency for themselves by not aligning with either Washington or Beijing in the context of their intensifying rivalry. One key premise of this approach was balancing relations between the two great powers — by turning to the US for security guarantees, and to China for increased trade and economic benefits. This gave rise to a body of literature on ‘hedging’ in the context of Southeast Asian foreign policy.  While there has been some academic debate about the extent to which Southeast Asian states truly ‘hedge’, even within this debate, there was a broad consensus that economics and security could largely be treated as separate domains when navigating the US-China competition in Southeast Asia.

The discourses on ‘supply chain diversification’, ‘friend-shoring’, and the ‘China-plus-one strategy’ reflect the integration of security concerns into trade and economic policies. US-China competition now spans all spheres, including security, economics, and technology, with significant overlaps.

These assumptions came under increasing scrutiny as geopolitical tensions intensified during the first Trump administration. The first Trump administration sought to pull the US out of emerging Indo-Pacific multilaterals such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and begin a trade war with China, undermining the very multilateral trading system the US had long championed. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic led to even greater chaos in the international trading regime, with trade levels plummeting, especially as China enforced a strict and extended period of domestic lockdown. The transition to the Biden administration marked a continuity in rising tariffs placed on Chinese imports into the US. More importantly, this period also saw the US increasingly framing China as a national security threat across the military, technological, and economic domains. The underlying logic was that over-reliance on China would have national security implications for the US. The discourses on ‘supply chain diversification’, ‘friend-shoring’, and the ‘China-plus-one strategy’ reflect the integration of security concerns into trade and economic policies. US-China competition now spans all spheres, including security, economics, and technology, with significant overlaps.

The above context weaves itself into the second Trump administration’s approach to the US-China competition. High tariffs have now extended beyond China to include Southeast Asian states, among others. More importantly, the Trump administration has signalled a willingness to condition the US’s longstanding security guarantees on trade negotiations. The ability of Southeast Asian states to depend on the US security umbrella while simultaneously enmeshing China within ASEAN-led and bilateral economic arrangements — as part of a ‘not choosing sides’ strategy — is becoming increasingly untenable.

Key Takeaways

First, Southeast Asian states will increasingly ‘have to choose’. This was evident even in 2018, when  Singapore’s then-Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated, “I think it is very desirable for us not to have to take sides, but the circumstances will come where ASEAN may have to choose one or the other (sic).” There is increasing evidence that states in Southeast Asia are drifting towards China. This drift can be explained by a range of factors, but two key reasons emerge: i) China’s drive to move beyond mere economic influence in Southeast Asia, and ii) the US’s declining credibility as a security guarantor in the region, particularly as it seeks to openly extract economic concessions in return for providing security.

There is increasing evidence that states in Southeast Asia are drifting towards China. This drift can be explained by a range of factors, but two key reasons emerge: i) China’s drive to move beyond mere economic influence in Southeast Asia, and ii) the US’s declining credibility as a security guarantor in the region.

Second, this drift to China is not necessarily a reflection of conscious will, as multiple surveys show that elites in Southeast Asia remain wary of Beijing’s intentions and continue to hold a favourable view of the United States. This drift is occurring because cumulatively, the Southeast Asian elites are increasingly opting for Chinese investments and Chinese-led initiatives over American ones, even if they believe they are straddling both powers. The nature and outcomes of the tariff negotiations during the rest of the current Trump administration will be key to predicting how these elites approach great power competition in Southeast Asia.

Why It Matters

This recalibration will influence how Southeast Asian states will negotiate broader Indo-Pacific regionalism. To balance relations with Washington and Beijing, some countries in the region are beginning to show greater openness to Indo-Pacific minilaterals than they have in the past. For example, there is already some discussion on how Southeast Asian states could participate in the activities of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) in the non-traditional security realm — without any formal membership in the grouping, or by being part of the earlier short-lived ‘QUAD-Plus’. This will open opportunities for India and Southeast Asian states to work together via the QUAD on non-traditional security matters. Besides the QUAD, some Southeast Asian states have also been more open to taking part in broader Indo-Pacific initiatives that are not ASEAN-led, such as the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), proposed by India several years ago at the East Asia Summit (EAS). Southeast Asian countries will thus increasingly look for spaces and opportunities to work with the US and its partners in the Indo-Pacific via institutions and processes that are not necessarily ASEAN-formed or led. Southeast Asian states have always been aware of the need to be flexible without surrendering their autonomy to the great powers. The current period presents both challenges and opportunities for the region to navigate this enduring goal.

Sinderpal Singh is a Senior Fellow and Assistant Director at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.